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A B S T R A C T 
 
This paper aims at studying the interaction between growth of real 
output and human capital accumulation when education requires investment of 
physical resources. To this end we investigate the aggregate implications of 
individual specific uncertainty about returns to investment in education in the 
absence of insurance markets. We do so in a general equilibrium OLG model in 
which physical resources must be devoted to education in order to accumulate 
human capital. We find that uncertainty with incomplete financial markets may 
strongly affect individual behavior but not the aggregate of the economy: 
different degrees of uncertainty will induce different intensities of human to 
physical capital but will not have a significant impact on the long run growth 
rate of the economy. This framework allows us to conclude that investing less 
in education in relative terms does not necessarily lead to less growth: the 
accumulation of physical and human capital display some degree of 
substitutability as an engine for long run growth. 
Keywords: Overlapping generations, Investment in education, 
Uninsured shocks, Human capital, Sustained growth. 
JEL\ classification numbers: E13, O41, I29. 
 1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to better understand the interaction between growth
of real output and human capital accumulation when education requires invest-
ment of physical resources. To this end we explore the role of uncertainty in
individual education decisions, and ultimately in long run growth patterns. The
departure point will be a model economy in which agents invest real resources
in education, thus leaving the door open to the possibility that output growth
causes the accumulation of human capital by creating resources afterwards allo-
cated to education. In this framework we will examine whether diﬀerent degrees
of uncertainty may generate diﬀerences in investment in education and in capital
intensities while leaving the output growth rate unchanged.
Ever since the seminal contributions of Schultz (1960, 1961) and Becker (1962),
investment and accumulation of human capital has been widely regarded as a
way to increase individual labor productivity and therefore labor earnings, on
one hand, and as an engine for sustained aggregate growth on the other hand.
If individual investment in education is positively aﬀected by the environment
(the current stock of human capital), the individual act of investment becomes
an accumulation process at the aggregate. In the mainstream view, education
increases labor productivity which in turn causes the economy to grow. A recent
U.S.Congress report reﬂects the view that “formal education is an important
determinant of individual earnings as well as economic growth.” Institutions like
the World Bank or the United Nations stress the importance of investment in
education for growth and foster policies directed towards the increase of formal
education.
There is, however, evidence that the causal relationship between education,
earnings, and growth is far from clear and that it may be more subtle. At the
individual level there are serious qualiﬁcations as for the role of formal education
in productivity. Recent contributions regard education as a consequence rather
than a cause: education would result from characteristics already determined in
earlier stages of the individual’s life (Stokey (1998) or Heckman (2000)). At the
aggregate level, we observe sharp diﬀerences both in schooling and in expenses in
education between developed and underdeveloped countries. U.N.estimates for
3school life expectancy in the nineties are roughly 10 years for developing countries
and 16 years for industrialized countries; expenses in education as a percentage
of GDP were around 3.9% for developing countries and around 5.4% for industri-
alized countries. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that there is no absolute
poverty trap: the poorest countries in 1960-1985 have been growing on average at
similar rates as the richest countries (Maddison (1995) and Parente and Prescott
(1995)). Further, there is some theoretical controversy as for the causal rela-
tionship between education and growth. Even if education is accepted as one of
the determinants of the steady growth of labor productivity, a growing economy
generates resources that can be allocated ex post to education (Bénabou (1996)).
In this paper we focus on the aggregate implications of education for growth
and viceversa. The evidence outlined above suggests both (a) that there are ways
to accumulate human capital other than formal training and (b) that time and
resources devoted to education relative to GDP cannot fully account for long
run growth in actual economies as suggested by schooling theories. The ﬁrst
observation motivates the search for mechanisms of human capital accumulation
complementary to that of formal education. For instance, Lucas (1993) stressed
the potential role of learning-by-doing in development processes. The second
observation motivates a closer look at the relationship between real (resources)
investment in education and growth. In particular, to the possibility that growing
economies may generate the real resources necessary to invest in education and
to accumulate human capital which in turn will cause the economy to grow.
The real nature of investment in human capital has already been emphasized
in early contributions to this literature. Schultz (1960) and Uzawa (1963) have
a broad notion of investment in human capital of which education is only one
aspect: they include health care and any other real expenditure aﬀecting the
quality of labor.2 From the individual point of view education is also regarded
as a long run project characterized by uncertainty. Diﬀerent innate abilities to
2Schultz (1961) traces the idea back to John Stuart Mill. This view is shared by
modern approaches to the question of education at the individual level. Stokey (1998)
emphasizes that expenditures in school fees are just a part of the parent’s investment
in their children.
4take advantage of formation, life length, the impact of family environment, or
simply unpredictable events, more likely to occur in such a long period, are some
of the identiﬁed sources of uncertainty aﬀecting educational choices (see Schultz
(1961) and Becker (1962) or more recently Kodde (1986)). Many authors have
analyzed the impact of uncertainty on individual decisions of education: Levhari
and Weiss (1974) carried out the ﬁrst formal analysis and were followed by many
others like Williams (1978, 1979) or more recently Snow and Warren (1990). Under
various ﬁnancial frameworks, they basically conﬁrm the intuition that uncertainty
negatively aﬀects the level of investment in education. These are, however, partial
equilibrium analyses.
T h i sp a p e ri si n t e n d e da saﬁrst step in the development of a general equilib-
rium model in which similar rates of growth are compatible with diﬀerent frac-
tions of output devoted to education. Following Michel (1993) we analyze an
OLG model in which agents have to invest resources in their education to pro-
duce human capital. The accumulation of human capital is the source of sustained
growth. Furthermore, individuals make their choice under uncertainty about the
returns to education and with no insurance (an idiosyncratic shock aﬀects the
individual production of human capital). We will discuss that diﬀerent degrees
of uncertainty can generate diﬀerences in expenses in education (as a fraction of
output) while leaving the growth rate relatively unchanged: The negative impact
of uncertainty on education at the individual level is not translated to the ag-
gregate because the accumulation of physical and human capital act as relative
s u b s t i t u t e sa sa ne n g i n ef o rg r o w t h .
2 Individual investment in human capital
The economy is represented by an overlapping generations model, a stochastic
version of that described in Michel (1993). The demand-side of the economy is
represented by a sequence of generations, each composed of a large number of
ex ante identical agents. The supply side of the economy is represented by a
single competitive ﬁrm endowed with a technology of constants returns to scale
in physical and human capital.
52.1 Households and human capital
Agents live for three periods. Consider the typical agent born in period t − 1.
In the ﬁrst period she decides educational investment Et ≥ 0.T o ﬁnance her
education she borrows in the ﬁnancial market: she issues the single asset of the
economy (there is no insurance). The resulting level of individual human capital
will be conditional on a productivity shock zt ∼ U[a,b] with a>0,a n do nt h e






where β ∈ (0,1). Returns to scale are assumed to be constant to ensure feasibility
of sustained growth.3 All agents are identical ex ante and their productivity shock
is independent from the others.4 Then Et is the same for all agents of generation
t − 1. Further, there is a large number of agents with mass normalized to one.
Hence, ex ante expectations are ex post averages and aggregates. For example,




t where µ is the expectation of the
shock.
Hereafter we will often work with variables per unit of stock of human capital
writing et = Et/Ht−1. Preferences over consumption will be homogeneous so that
this transformation applies to both consumptions as described below.
There is no aggregate uncertainty and prices are perfectly forecasted by the
3This function meets the condition in Levhari and Weiss (1977, page 956) for un-
certainty to have a negative eﬀect on education. The assumption is quite appealing: it
would be diﬃcult to justify a positive eﬀect of zt on returns and a negative eﬀect on
marginal returns because it would suggest that higher skills (human capital) would be
associated with lower marginal ability to increase skills (further accumulation of human
capital through schooling).
4As discussed in the introduction, this individual speciﬁc ability to accumulate hu-
man capital can be interpreted to be partially innate or can be assumed to represent
external factors: Schultz (1961) cites access to health services, Card and Krueger (1992)
and Kodde (1986) point out the quality of schooling while Altonji and Dunn (1996)
stress the family background (see again Stokey (1998) for a related discussion). These
interpretations seem to ﬁt well the assumption of independence.
6agent. The real interest rate rt,r t+1 > 0 and the real wage per eﬃciency unit
wt > 0 are taken as given by the agent. Leisure is not valued: the agent supplies
inelastically her human capital stock. Dividing by Ht−1,n e ti n c o m en e x tp e r i o d
(labor earnings minus debt) will be mt(zt)=ztwte
β
t − (1 + rt)et.T h e a g e n t
chooses consumption in the second and third periods of her life ct(zt),d t+1(zt) ≥ 0
as well as savings st(zt) contingent to the realization of zt so as to verify the set
of contingent budget constraints
ct(zt)+st(zt) ≤ mt(zt) (2)
dt+1(zt) ≤ (1 + rt+1)st(zt). (3)
These variables are expressed in terms of per unit of human capital. Beneﬁts
will be zero so that equilibrium prices of shares will be zero as well. Since there
is no insurance (and bankruptcy is not allowed) the non negativity constraints
on consumption and the budget constraints impose mt(zt) ≥ 0 for all zt.T h i s
is equivalent to impose mt(a) ≥ 0 or et ≤ ¯ et where ¯ et is deﬁned implicitly as
awt¯ e
β
t − (1 + rt)¯ et =0 .T h a t i s , a ﬀordable choices of educational investment
should not induce negative net income in any state of nature.
We shall refer to this constraint et ≤ ¯ et as the limit to borrowing: any higher
borrowing would lead the agent to bankruptcy in the worst states of nature. This
limit to borrowing stems from the no bankruptcy assumption underlying any gen-
eral equilibrium model together with the particular market structure considered.5
2.2 The saving rule and indirect utility
The agent has preferences deﬁned over contingent plans of consumption ct(zt) and







5The limit to borrowing is a consequence of the absence of insurance (incomplete
markets) and not exogenously imposed: it should not be mistaken with an (exogenously
imposed) borrowing constraint (generally considered a capital markets’ imperfection).
7where ε ∈ (0,1) and θ ≥ 0. The density of zt is a positive constant and therefore
ignored. When θ =1the integrand is interpreted to be the logarithm (in the sense
that U converges pointwise to the integral of the logarithm log(ct(zt)εdt+1(zt)1−ε)).
We choose these preferences because the saving rate is independent of the relative
degree of risk aversion θ.6
Since consumption choices across stateso fn a t u r ea r es e p a r a b l ew ec a ns o l v et h e
problem backwards. Fixed some zt and et, the agent maximizes ct(zt)εdt+1(zt)1−ε
subject to (2) and (3). As soon as mt(zt) > 0 t h es o l u t i o ni si n t e r i o r . F u r t h e r ,
the budget constraints must be binding at the optimum as the objective function
is increasing in both arguments. Hence, the optimal saving rule is
st(zt)=( 1− ε)mt(zt), (4)
a linear function of income because preferences are homothetic. This is also the
optimal rule when mt(zt)=0because in that case st(zt)=0 . Since the objec-
tive function is strictly quasiconcave and the budget set convex, expression (4)
describes the unique solution to the problem given net income.
Introducing this optimal rule in the budget constraints and these in the objec-
tive function yields χmt(zt) for all mt(zt) ≥ 0 where χ > 0 is a constant from the
individual point of view. Use the deﬁnition of mt(zt) in terms of et and introduce






t − (1 + rt)et)1−θ − 1
1 − θ
dzt,
the indirect utility function.7 The function V is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly concave, and V  (0) = ∞. Moreover, it is continuous and diﬀerentiable as
a function of parameters a, b,a n dθ. The proof of these statements is standard
and therefore omitted.
6If the degree of risk aversion were related to the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution, it would be diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of risk aversion from that of the
savings rate in the aggregate.
7We have omitted the term χ1−θ, a positive constant: add and substract χ1−θ(1−θ)−1
and operate to conclude that this is the relevant indirect utility function in the sense
that it represents the same preferences.
82.3 Optimal choices of education
Avoid the trivial case of no uncertainty assuming hereafter that a<bso that the
standard deviation of the shock is positive: σ > 0. Unless otherwise stated we
shall also assume that θ > 0, that is, we concentrate on the case of risk aversion.
The optimal rule of investment in education has constant elasticity with respect
to the ratio of prices:
Proposition 1 For all parameters speciﬁcations and prices wt/(1+rt) > 0 there
is a unique optimal choice e∗















where Q = a when the limit to borrowing is binding and Q = M>0 when the
solution is interior; M will then be a function of parameters a, b, β, α,a n dθ.
Proof:S i n c e V is continuous and [0,¯ et] compact, an optimal solution e∗
t ex-
ists. Uniqueness follows from strict concavity of V . This solution cannot be zero









t − (1 + rt))dzt =0 . (6)
Since rt > −1 and e∗


















dzt =0 . (7)
Implicitly e∗
t = ϕ(wt/(1 + rt)). Since the left hand side of the equation is a
continuously diﬀerentiable function of the ratio of prices and of education, the







































































































dz =0 . (8)
This equation has a unique solution because optimal education is unique and the
rule ϕ is strictly increasing in M. The solution depends on the values of a, b, β,
and θ, and indirectly of µ and σ through a and b.














That is, the limit to borrowing ¯ et expressed in terms of its value as a function of
wt, rt, β,a n da.
An immediate consequence of the proposition above is that M<awhen the
solution is interior.
The eﬀect of prices on the choice of education is obvious. Increasing the wage
(or decreasing the interest rate) uniformly increases net returns to education over
all states of nature inducing higher levels of education. More interesting is the
eﬀect of risk aversion and the incomplete structure of ﬁnancial markets: Risk
aversion reduces (interior choices of) investment in education as it will make the
agent care relatively more about the bad states of nature.
Proposition 2 Interior optimal choices of investment in education are strictly
decreasing in risk aversion as represented by θ. Border solutions are insensitive
to inﬁnitesimal changes of θ.
10Proof:W h e nV  (¯ et) > 0 the limit to borrowing is binding. Since V   is a con-
tinuous function of θ,i n ﬁnitesimal changes in this parameter will not aﬀect this
inequality while the limit to borrowing itself does not depend on θ.
Now suppose that M is the solution to (8) for some θ ≥ 0 and let θ
  > θ.L e t
˜ z be the only value of the shock for which (˜ zM−1 − 1)−θ(˜ zβM−1 − 1) = 0.T h e n






−1 − 1)dz = −

































−1 − 1)dz < −







The overall eﬀect is negative because multiplying the integrand by (zM−1 −
1)−(θ −θ) amounts to assign a bigger weight to the negative part of the integral







−1 − 1)dz < 0
implying that M is not optimal for θ
 .S i n c eV   is strictly decreasing in et it must
be the case that the left hand side of this expression is strictly decreasing in M.
Hence, the new optimal M  must be such that M  <M.
Some notation: for any z ∈ [a,b] we will write ez,t to denote the value of
investment in education that veriﬁes zwtβe
β−1
z,t − (1 + rt)=0 .
Lemma 1 For all parameters speciﬁcations it is true that ea,t <e ∗
t ≤ min{¯ et,e µ,t}.
In other words, it is true that βa<M≤ min{a,βµ}.
11Proof:S u p p o s et h a tea,t >e ∗
t,t h e nztwtβe
∗β−1
t −(1+rt) ≥ awtβe
∗β−1
t −(1+rt) > 0
for all zt.A ni n ﬁnitesimal increase of e∗
t would induce a marginal increase of net




t ≤ ¯ et follows from the limit to borrowing. Finally, suppose that eµ,t <
¯ et, then follow the proof of proposition 2 for θ =0to show that e∗
t <e µ,t.
Observe that the proof of proposition 2 could have been written in terms
of the ﬁrst order condition and e∗
t with any other distribution function. First,
the constant elasticity optimal rule of proposition 1 holds for any distribution
F with support inﬁmum a>0; second, in the proof of proposition 2, whenever
(zM−1 − 1)−θ appears, it can be exchanged by marginal utility in state z and
(zβM−1−1) by marginal income in expression (6). In short, the proofs above can
be reproduced without the uniform distribution assumption.
The uniform distribution was assumed for simplicity in the next proof and
in the interpretation of the numerical simulations: the eﬀect of σ is readily in-
terpreted when the shock is uniformly distributed because other moments of the
distribution are very simple.
Proposition 3 Optimal investment in education, binding or not, is strictly de-
creasing in σ (the standard deviation of the shock zt), µ constant.
Proof: When the solution is e∗
t =¯ et,d e c r e a s i n ga directly decreases the optimal
choice as it is clear from expression (9). When the solution is interior, with a










−1 − 1)dz =0 .
We need the left hand side of this expression to be decreasing in σ for optimal M
to be decreasing in σ because the integral is decreasing in M (see the end of the
previous proof). Applying Leibniz rule it is clear that the integral is decreasing








12The rest of the proof is devoted to show that this inequality holds.
Let M solve (8) for some given value σ > 0 and let n be the (only) linear








where n(a) < 0 and n(b) > 0 because by lemma 1 interior solutions verify βa<
M<βµ<βb.S u p p o s et h a tn(a)+n(b) > 0 contradicting the inequality above.
Let ˜ z be the critical value for which ˜ zβM−1 − 1=0and note that M<βµ so






(n(b)(b − ˜ z)+n(a)(˜ z − a)) >
1
2





On the other hand, since the integrand is strictly concave or decreasing it must
















thus contradicting that M i sas o l u t i o nt o( 8 ) .
O b s e r v et h a t( i nv i e wo ft h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yi nt h ep r o o f )t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of
σ becomes stronger as the concavity of the integral, as measured by θ,i n c r e a s e s .
In other words, a higher degree of risk aversion will worsen the eﬀect of σ on the
optimal choice of investment in education. Figure 1 plots the typical simulation
of the individual decision for an array of values of θ and σ.8 We set µ =8and
8The routines used to simulate individual and aggregate behavior in this economy
are based in a simple bisection procedure to ﬁnd a solution to (8). The code is written
in Matlab and is available from the authors upon request.
13Figure 1: The eﬀect of risk aversion and the limit to borrowing
let a = µ − n and b = µ + n. In the third axis we plot diﬀerent values n from
zero to 8 so that n =8represents a =0 . The degree of risk aversion ranges
from risk neutral θ =0to θ =3 . The strong eﬀect of the lack of insurance
markets at the individual level is reﬂected in this ﬁgure: When the agent is risk
neutral she chooses eµ up to the point where a is so low that she has to choose the
corner solution ¯ e. As the agent becomes risk averse, the eﬀect of lowering a will
operate sooner: her risk aversion makes her care very soon about the worst states
of nature. She therefore lowers e∗ in an eﬀort to increase income in those bad
states of nature. In a world with insurance, although one would expect education
to decrease with σ,t h ee ﬀect would be less obvious and not as dramatic when a
is driven to zero.9
9It may be worth stressing that whether the limit to borrowing is binding or not is
irrelevant. In the plot it is obvious where the constraint is binding: for low values of θ
and low values of a (high values of n). It can proven that for θ ≥ 1 the constraint is
never binding. What matters, however, is that the agent is led to choose zero investment
when a =0because of the contraction of the choice set.
14In the absence of insurance, uncertainty strongly discourages investment in
education. As we will see in the next section, however, at the aggregate this
negative eﬀect is attenuated and may even be reversed. As a consequence the
long run growth rate of the economy will be rather insensitive to the degree of
uncertainty.
3 The equilibrium of the economy
In this section we introduce the representative ﬁrm and deﬁne a competitive equi-
librium for this economy. We will prove existence of a unique equilibrium and long
run convergence of transformed stationary variables to a unique steady state.
3.1 The ﬁrm
The supply side of the economy is represented by a standard single competitive
ﬁrm producing output in t from output in t − 1 (physical capital) and eﬀective
labor in t (human capital). The ﬁrm is endowed with technology represented by a
Cobb-Douglas production function with share of physical capital α ∈ (0,1),s c a l e
factor A>0, and full depreciation for simplicity.
The ﬁrm borrows its stock of capital Kt ≥ 0 i nt h ec r e d i tm a r k e ti np e r i o dt
and returns 1+rt t h en e x tp e r i o d .S i n c ea g e n t sd on o tc a r ea b o u tl e i s u r e ,t h e y
inelastically supply their stock of human capital so that in equilibrium Ht is also
the eﬀective labor hired by the ﬁrm. Deﬁne kt = Kt/Ht, then the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order
conditions can be written as wt = A(1 − α)kα




T h ec r e d i tm a r k e tc l e a r a n c er e q u i r e sKt+1 + Et+1 = St where St/Ht =( 1 −
ε)(wt −(1/µ)(1+rt)e
1−β
t ) is obtained integrating the optimal saving rule (4) over
zt (that is, over individuals) and dividing it by µe
β
t making use of the fact that
Ht/Ht−1 = µe
β













.( 1 0 )
This equation, the agent’s optimal rule ϕ and the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions,
which incorporate the labor market clearance condition, describe competitive equi-
libria for this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 Given an initial stock of physical capital k0 > 0, a competitive equi-
librium (for the stationary variables) is an allocation (kt+1,e t)∞
t=0 and a sequence of
prices (wt,r t)∞
t=0 such that et = ϕ(wt/(1+rt)), wt = A(1−α)kα
t , 1+rt = Aαk
α−1
t ,
and such that (10) holds for all t ≥ 0.
Consumption and savings can be recovered from the optimal saving rule (4)
and the agent’s budget constraints (2) and (3). Substituting prices for their values



























where Q = a or M when the solution induced by kt is corner or interior respec-
tively. Equilibrium exists, is unique, and converges to a steady state (˜ k,˜ e).
Proposition 4 For all k0 > 0 there is a unique competitive equilibrium. Com-
petitive equilibrium allocations converge monotonically to a single interior steady
state (˜ k,˜ e) independently of initial conditions.
Proof:L e tkt > 0 be any stock of capital. At interior solutions Q = M while M
exists and is unique by proposition 1. At corner solutions Q = a.I nb o t hc a s e s
au n i q u eet of equilibrium is determined by equation (11). Direct substitution of



























16Suppose that a<µ . Then, if the solution is interior Q = M<µbecause M<βµ
by lemma 1, otherwise Q = a<µ . Alternatively suppose that a = µ, then the
solution is interior and Q = M = βµ<µ .I n b o t h c a s e s Q<µso that (13) is
strictly positive and well deﬁned. In short, kt uniquely determines kt+1 which in
turn, again through equation (11), uniquely determines et+1: a unique competitive
equilibrium exists.
Write kt+1 = η(kt) and observe that η is a diﬀerentiable, strictly concave,
strictly increasing function of kt with η (0) = ∞ and η (∞)=0 . Hence, there is


























and kt → ˜ k monotonically. The steady state value of education ˜ e is simply given
by equation (11) evaluated at ˜ k.
An alternative approach to the question of existence of a competitive equilib-
rium consists of having a closer look at the left hand side of equation (12). Given
any equilibrium allocation (kt,e t), equation (12) implicitly describes the combi-
nations of education and capital et+1 = ψ(kt+1,k t,e t) for the next period that
clear the credit market. For any allocation (kt+1,e t+1) to be an equilibrium for
the next period it must be true that et+1 = ψ(kt+1,k t,e t) and that et+1 = ϕ(kt+1)
(the abuse of notation is justiﬁed because wt+1/(1 + rt+1) is a function of kt+1).
Since ϕ is exponentially increasing in k and zero at k =0 ,i tw o u l ds u ﬃce that
ψ is positive at zero and decreasing to prove that there is a unique equilibrium.
If kt+1µe
β
t+1 + et+1 is to remain equal to a constant, when kt+1 =0it must be
the case that et+1 > 0 while as kt+1 →∞education should converge to zero.
Hence, an equilibrium exists. It is unique because kt+1µe
β
t+1 + et+1 is increasing
in education and capital so that ψ1 < 0. With this reasoning in mind the proof
of the following result is straightforward:
Proposition 5 Fixed an equilibrium (kt,e t), the equilibrium allocation for capital
kt+1 (resp. education et+1) next period is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) with
θ when et+1 is interior, and strictly increasing (resp. decreasing) with σ.
17Proof:N o t e t h a t ψ is independent of θ and σ while ϕ is strictly decreasing
with θ when the solution is interior (proposition 2) and strictly decreasing with
σ (proposition 3). An increase in σ,a n d / o ri nθ when interior, would cause ϕ to
shift downwards uniformly: the new equilibrium allocation would result from a
s h i f tt ot h er i g h ta l o n gt h eg r a p ho fψ, a decreasing function.
Fixed any equilibrium allocation (kt,e t),a ni n c r e a s eo fσ in period t will induce
individuals next period to invest less in education et+1, and more in physical
capital kt+1. The increase in kt+1 may stimulate future investment in education
et+2. Indeed, at the aggregate the increased ratio of physical to human capital
will result in higher savings. From equation (10) we can write
St+1
Ht+1









An higher σ increases kt+1 and decreases Q. As a consequence, aggregate savings
per unit of human capital rise and so do the available resources to be allocated to
kt+2 and et+2. This is the resources eﬀect. The subsequent increase in kt+2 will
have in turn consequences as for the individual behavior: a higher wage wt+2 and
lower interest rate rt+2 make investment in human capital et+2 relatively more
a t t r a c t i v e .T h i si st h ep r i c ee ﬀect.
In short, less investment in education today means relatively more physical
resources available for the future, and thus potentially allows more future invest-
ment in education. As we shall see, this mechanism underlies the ambiguous eﬀect
of σ on the long run growth rate.
3.3 The steady state growth rate
In models of schooling increasing physical capital for tomorrow increases the wage
and therefore the incentive to devote time to schooling today. Here the price eﬀect
is analogous: it increases the wage and reduces the interest rate and therefore
stimulates investment in education. However, there is an additional eﬀect: the
higher ratio of physical to human capital increases savings, and thus increases
the amount of resources available for education. In contrast with the (ﬁxed) time
endowment model, in our economy resources can be created (and subsequently
18allocated to education) in an unbounded manner, leaving room for a sustained
resources eﬀect. In the long run this mechanism will cause the aggregrate impact
of uncertainty to be ambiguous despite its strong negative eﬀect at the individual
level.
Along a balanced growth path ˜ k = Kt/Ht will be describing whether an econ-
omy is more or less physical capital intensive (relative to human capital) while ˜ e
will be a proxy for the long run growth rate because all aggregate variables will be
growing at the same rate as the stock of human capital Ht+1/Ht = µ˜ eβ.10 Higher
degrees of uncertainty always increase ˜ k, and therefore they are associated with
more physical capital intensive balanced paths.
Proposition 6 For all parameters speciﬁcations, d˜ k/dσ > 0. That is, economies
with high σ are more physical capital intensive than economies with low σ.



































  < 0. (15)
To see why the negative sign recall the proof of proposition 4 where it is shown
that Q<µso that (1 − (Q/µ)) > 0. Finally observe that ˜ k only depends on σ









because dQ/dσ < 0:w h e nQ = a trivially, and when Q = M by proposition 3.
In short, an increase of σ, by decreasing Q,w i l li n c r e a s e˜ k. This is further also






αµ + Q(1 − α)
,
10Observe that unless µ and A are high enough there is no guarantee that µ˜ eβ > 1.
For the growth rate to be positive the (expected) scale of the human capital production
function and the scale of the physical good production function should be high enough
to generate the resources necessary to sustain growth.
19is increasing with σ (because dQ/dσ < 0) c o m b i n e dw i t ht h ef a c tt h a ta g g r e g a t e
savings S/H also increases with σ. Hence, the reasoning of the previous subsection
holds in the long run: economies characterized by a higher σ are more physical
capital intensive and have more resources to invest.
Contrary to the determinate eﬀect of σ on ˜ k,i t se ﬀect on ˜ e,a n dt h e r e f o r eo n
the growth rate, is ambiguous. Observe that the increase of ˜ ρk implies a decrease
of ˜ ρe, the share of education in savings. Nevertheless, aggregate savings S/H are
increasing with σ. These two opposite eﬀects explain why the eﬀect of σ on ˜ e




















This expression renders explicit the two mechanisms operating in the impact of
σ on ˜ e.T h e ﬁrst term inside the brackets is negative as dQ/dσ < 0, while the
second is positive because d˜ k/dσ > 0 by the proposition above. The ﬁrst term
summarizes the eﬀect of the absence of insurance at the individual level while
the second captures the price and resources eﬀects. For reasonable parameters’
speciﬁcations the steady state growth rate appears to be relatively insensitive with
respect to small changes in σ. Indeed, using (15) and after some cumbersome (and
therefore omitted) algebra it can be shown that either of the two eﬀects can be











the price and resources eﬀect dominate the no insurance eﬀect, and therefore in-
crease ˜ e despite the higher degree of uncertainty. The veriﬁcation of this inequality
implies that ˜ ρk is growing with σ to a smaller extent than aggregate savings. That
is, both available resources and investment in physical capital (both per unit of
human capital) increase with σ, but the former more than the latter. When the
no insurance eﬀect dominates the price and resource eﬀects, the reverse reasoning
applies.
Figure 2 plots the typical numerical simulation for the long run growth rate
for an array of values for θ and σ (we considered the same parameters’ values as in
20Figure 2: The impact of no insurance in the long run
section 2). The ambiguous impact of σ contrasts with the strong negative impact
we observed at the individual level. Of course, as a tends to zero the negative
impact will ﬁnally dominate as agents are forced by their budget constraints to
invest zero in education.
3.4 Education expenditures as a percentage of GDP: a
suitable indicator for economic performance?
Investment in education is, not surprisingly, an important indicator when evaluat-
ing the economic and social performance of a country. From the economic point of
view, education enlarges the stock of human capital widely regarded as an engine
of endogenous growth. From the social point of view education is a way of emanci-
pating people; and more speciﬁcally, when publicly provided, education generally
allows to reduce inequalities. The relevant ﬁgures on education in the data often
refer to investment in education as a percentage of GDP. In this subsection we
will have a look at this indicator in the light of our model. More particularly, we
will examine the relation between the proportion of available resources devoted
to education E/Y, and the long run growth rate.
21In period t the proportion of national product Yt devoted to individual invest-
ment in education Et+1 is given by Et+1/Yt = et+1/(Akα
t ),o ri nt h el o n gr u nb y
E/Y = e/(Akα).T h ee ﬀect of an increase in the degree of uncertainty σ on this















As observed before, for reasonable parameters the long run growth rate, deter-
mined by e, is relatively insensitive to σ; hence (de/e)/(dσ/σ)   0.I nt h a tc a s e
an increase in σ has a negative eﬀect on E/Y given the fact that dk/dσ > 0.
Stated diﬀerently, similar growth rates are compatible with diﬀerent proportions
of national product invested in education. This leads us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Economies that invest a smaller proportion of their GDP in education
do not necessarily display lower growth rates.
Indeed, when this smaller proportion is accompanied by a higher physical
capital intensity k, the growth rate does not need to be negatively aﬀected: human
and physical capital are relative substitutes as an engine for growth, making the
link between educational investment and growth less straightforward.
According to our model the proportion of GDP devoted to education is thus
less suitable an indicator for economic performance as far as economic growth
is concerned. Yet this does not in any way temper the rationale for providing
public education. As mentioned before, education does not only serve economic
goals; it can also constitute a powerful tool to ﬁght social exclusion and to smooth
inequality.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ea n a l y z e dag e n e r a le quilibrium model of investment in edu-
cation when the returns to this investment are uncertain and agents cannot insure
themselves. Conﬁrming previous partial equilibrium analyses, at the individual
level the impact of uncertainty is negative and very strong. Nevertheless, at the
aggregate other mechanisms operate compensating the initial individual incentive
22to reduce investment in education when uncertainty is introduced. The model
economy describes a world in which diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty can yield
diﬀerent capital intensities but similar long run growth rates.
It is commonly accepted that the accumulation of human capital is at least one
of the characteristics that allow modern market economies to grow sustainably.
In this paper it is shown that the mechanisms by which human capital induces
growth may be subtle. When education is modeled as an investment in terms of
physical resources, rather than schooling, education causes growth but growth also
causes education: making resources available that will eventually be allocated to
education in the future. In short, the accumulation of physical and human capital
display some degree of substitutability as an engine for long run growth: two
economies identical except for the variance of the productivity shock may grow at
t h es a m er a t ea l o n gt w od i ﬀerent paths: one will be more physical capital intensive
than the other, and will invest a smaller proportion of its GDP in education. In
terms of economic policy, these results suggest that policies of public education
should be conceived as a mean to smooth inequality, rather than to foster growth.
References
[1] Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1992) “Distribution and growth in models of
imperfect capital markets,” European Economic Review, 36, 603-611.
[2] Altonji, J.G. and T.A. Dunn (1996) “The eﬀects of family characteristics on
the return to education,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 692—704.
[3] Becker, G.S. (1962) “Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis,”
Journal of Political Economy, 70, 9—49.
[4] Becker, G.S. (1975) Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with
special reference to education. Columbia University Press.
[5] Card, D. and A.B. Krueger (1992) “Does school quality matter? Returns
to education and the characteristics of public schools in the United States,”
Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1—40.
23[6] Galor, O. and Zeira, J. (1993) “Income distribution and macroeconomics,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.
[7] Kodde, D.A. (1986) “Uncertainty and the demand for education,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 68, 460-467.
[8] Kodde, D.A. and J.M.M. Ritzen (1985) “The demand for education under
capital market imperfections,” European Economic Review, 28, 347-362.
[9] Levhari, D. and Y. Weiss (1974) “The eﬀect of risk on the investment in
human capital,” American Economic Review, 64(6), 950—963.
[10] Lucas, Jr., R.E. (1988) “On the mechanics of economic development,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 22, 3-42.
[11] Michel, P. (1993) “Le modèle à générations imbriquées, un instrument
d’analyse macroéconomique,” Revue d’Economie Politique, 103, 191—220.
[12] Schultz, T.W. (1960) “Capital formation by education,” Journal of Political
Economy, 69, 571—583.
[13] Schultz, T.W. (1961) “Investment in human capital,” American Economic
Review, 51(1), 1—17.
[14] Snow, A. and R.S. Warren (1990) “Human capital investment and labor
supply under uncertainty,” International Economic Review, 195-205.
[15] Stokey, N. (1998) “Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves: the economics of social mobil-
ity,” in Ehud Kalai (ed.) Collected Volume of Nancy L. Schwartz Lectures.
Cambridge University Press.
[16] U.S.Congress (2000) “Investment in education: Private and public returns,”
Joint Economic Committee, Vice Chairman Jim Saxton (R-NJ), January.
[17] Williams, J.T. (1978) “Risk, human capital, and the investor’s portfolio,”
Journal of Business, 51(1), 65-89.
[18] Williams, J.T. (1979) “Uncertainty and the accumulation of human capital
over the life cycle,” Journal of Business, 52(4), 521-548.
24